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Abstract. Deep neural networks are being applied in many tasks with
encouraging results, and have often reached human-level performance.
However, deep neural networks are vulnerable to well-designed input
samples called adversarial examples. In particular, neural networks tend
to misclassify adversarial examples that are imperceptible to humans.
This paper introduces a new detection system that automatically de-
tects adversarial examples on deep neural networks. Our proposed sys-
tem can mostly distinguish adversarial samples and benign images in an
end-to-end manner without human intervention. We exploit the impor-
tant role of the frequency domain in adversarial samples, and propose
a method that detects malicious samples in observations. When evalu-
ated on two standard benchmark datasets (MNIST and ImageNet), our
method achieved an out-detection rate of 99.7–100% in many settings.
Keywords: Deep Neural Networks · Adversarial Examples · Detection
Systems.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) were developed as a machine learning approach to
many complex tasks. Traditional machine learning methods are successful when
the final value is a simple function of the input data. Conversely, DNNs can cap-
ture the composite relations between millions of pixels and textual descriptions,
brand-related news, future stock prices, and other contextual information. DNNs
attain state-of-the-art performance in practical tasks of many domains, such as
natural language processing, image processing, and speech recognition [9]. Cur-
rent state-of-the-art DNNs are usually designed to be robust to noisy data; that
is, the estimated label of a DNN output is insensitive to small noises in the
data. Noise robustness is a fundamental characteristic of DNN applications in
real, uncontrolled, and possibly hostile environments. However, recent research
has shown that DNNs are vulnerable to specially-crafted adversarial perturba-
tions (also known as adversarial examples) [3,5], well-designed fluctuating inputs
that are added to clean inputs. Developers of machine learning models assume
a legitimate environment in both training and testing. Intuitively, the inputs X
are assumed to come from the same distribution during both training and test
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times. That is, if the test inputs X are new and previously unseen during the
training process, they at least have the same properties as the inputs used for
training. These assumptions ensure a powerful machine learning model, but any
attacker can alter the distribution during either the training time [20] or the test-
ing time [1]. Typical training attacks [6] try to inject adversarial training data
into the original training set. If successful, these data will wrongly train the deep
learning model. However, most of the existing adversarial methods attack the
testing phase [2,12], which is more reliable than attacking the training phase.
Especially, training-phase attacks are more difficult to implement and should
not be launched without first exploiting the machine learning system. For exam-
ple, an attacker might slightly modify an image [20], causing it to be recognized
incorrectly, or adjust the code of an executable file to enable its escape by a mal-
ware detector [4]. Many researchers have developed defense mechanisms against
adversarial examples. For example, Papernot et al. [15] deployed a distillation
algorithm against adversarial perturbations. However, as pointed out by Carnili
et al. [2], this method cannot improve the robustness of a DNN system. Several
other adversarial defense approaches have also been published [2,12]. Carlini et
al. [2] proposed new attacks based on three previously used distance metrics:
L0, L2 and L∞, and evaluated the defenses of DNNs under the proposed attack
methods. Madry et al. [12] applied a natural saddle-point method that guards
against adversarial examples in a principled manner. They found that the net-
work architecture affects the adversarial robustness of a DNN, so the robust
decision boundary of the saddle-point problem can be more complicated than
a decision boundary that simply categorizes the legitimate data. Preprocessing-
based defense strategies against adversarial examples, which are the focus of our
current work, will be reviewed and discussed in Sec. 2.
Our Contributions This paper introduces new techniques for overcoming ad-
versarial examples. Our proposed system can automatically detect and classify
both adversarial and legitimate samples. Assuming that most of the adversarial
perturbations are created in the high frequencies of the image, we seek to reduce
the high-frequency adversarial noises while retaining the benign high-frequency
features. To prove our hypothesis, we first installed a low-pass filter layer be-
tween the adversarial example and target classifier. The probability of detecting
the target class by the classifier dropped significantly (to nearly zero), but the
recognition results of the primary class were retained. In Sec. 3, we demonstrate
the correctness of these implementations in a theoretical proof. Based on the
previous observation, we propose a new end-to-end system that automatically
detects adversarial examples by a sieve layer inserted between the input and
DNN, which traps suspicious noises. In parallel with this process, the un-sieved
input is fed to the classifier and the highest-confidence class is marked as an
anchor. The probabilities of the anchor and sieved input from the classifier are
then compared, and the final decision on the input (adversarial or benign) is
determined by a specified fixed threshold. Our main idea is depicted in Fig. 1.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
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Fig. 1: Processes of our automated detection system: an input is duplicated and
the actual and duplicated inputs are directed into two parallel processing flows.
In one processing direction (green arrow), the high-frequency adversarial noises
are captured by the sieve layer; in the other direction (yellow arrow), all data are
forwarded to the target model. The probability of the highest-confidence class is
designated as the anchor for tracking in the green direction (called the sieve in
our system). By comparing the difference between the anchor and sieve based
on a fixed threshold, our system identifies the input as benign or adversarial.
– We investigated and analyzed various attack approaches for crafting adver-
sarial examples. By summarizing the different attack strategies, we provide
an intuitive overview of these attack methods.
– We investigated the modern defense approaches and their variants in adver-
sarial settings. We assumed that most of the adversarial perturbations are
created at high frequencies. After implementing many experiments based on
our theoretical framework, we confidently affirm our hypothesis.
– After thoroughly analyzing our experimental and theoretical observations,
we created a new automated detection method for adversarial examples.
Our approach differs from previous researches, in which the experimental
steps are typically based only on the original hypothesis. Our approach was
successfully applied to two types of common datasets: a small-scale dataset
(Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology [MNIST]) and
a large-scale dataset (ImageNet). Our defense method accurately classified
the adversarial examples and legitimate samples. Moreover, in some cases,
it recovered the high accuracy rates of the DNN classification.
Outlines of the paper The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces related works, the background of adversarial examples, and
current adversarial attack/defense approaches. Section 3 describes our proposed
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method, and Section 4 presents our experiments and evaluation results on both
benchmark datasets (MNIST and ImageNet). Section 5 summaries our work.
2 Related Works and Background
2.1 Related Works
Removing the adversarial noises and regaining the recognition integrity of classi-
fiers have been attempted in several works. Liao et al. [11] developed High-level
representation Guided Denoiser (HGD) as a defense for image classification sys-
tems. They argued that many defense models cannot remove all adversarial per-
turbations, and that the non-removed adversarial noises are greatly amplified in
the top layers of the target model. Consequently, the model will output a wrong
prediction. To overcome this problem, they trained a denoiser by an HGD loss
function. However, their proposed system was implemented only on ImageNet,
which contains color images, and was not trialed on grayscale datasets such as
MNIST. Although this omission is not highly important, the performance of a
method based on high-level representation in a very deep neural network may
degrade on grayscale images, whereas a simple neural network performs accu-
rately on MNIST data. The strategy of Xu et al. [21], which they called ”feature
squeezing”, reduces the number of degrees of freedom available to an adversary
by squeezing out the unnecessary input features. The squeezing is performed by
two denoisers performing different denoising methods: (1) squeezing the color
bit depth, and (2) spatial smoothing. The prediction results are then compared
with those of the target model, and the input is inferred as adversarial or le-
gitimate. Although Xu et al. [21] evaluated their proposed method on various
adversarial attacks, how they specified their thresholds on different benchmark
datasets is unclear. Deciding appropriate thresholds for their system will over-
burden operators, and the method cannot easily adapt to new and unknown
datasets.
2.2 Background
Deep Neural Networks In this subsection, we review neural networks in
detail and introduce the required notation and definitions. Neural networks con-
sist of elementary computing units named neurons organized in interconnected
layers. Each neuron applies an activation function to its input, and produces
an output. Starting with the input to the machine learning model, the output
produced by each layer of the network provides the input to the next layer. Net-
works with a single intermediate hidden layer are called shallow neural networks,
whereas those with multiple hidden layers are DNNs. The multiple hidden layers
hierarchically extract representations from the model input, eventually produc-
ing a representation for solving the machine learning task and outputting a
prediction. A neural network model F can be formalized as multidimensional
and parametrized functions fi, each corresponding to one layer of the network
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architecture and one representation of the input. Specifically, each vector θi
parametrizes layer i of the network F and includes weights for the links con-
necting layer i to layer i1. The set of model parameters θ = {θi} is learned
during training. For instance, in supervised learning, the parameter values are
learned by computing the prediction errors f(x) − y on a collection of known
input–output pairs (x, y).
Adversarial Attacks The adversarial examples and their counterparts are
considered to be indistinguishable by humans. Because human perception is
difficult to model, it is often approximated by three distance metrics based on
the Lp norm:
||x||p =
( n∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
. (1)
The L0, L2, L∞ metrics are usually used for expressing different aspects of
visual significance. L0 counts the number of pixels with different values at the
corresponding positions in two images. This measure describes the number of
pixels that differ between two images. L2 measures the Euclidean distance be-
tween two images, and L∞ helps to measure the maximum difference among all
pixels at the corresponding positions in two images. The best distance metric
depends on the proposed algorithms.
Szegedy et al. [19] created targeted adversarial examples by a method called
Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS), which minimizes
the weighted sum of the perturbation size ε and loss function L(x∗, ytarget) while
constraining the elements of x∗ to normal pixel values.
According to Goodfellow et al. [3], adversarial examples can be caused by the
cumulative effects of high-dimensional model weights. They proposed a simple
attack method called the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM):
x∗ = x+ ε · sign(OxL(x, y)), (2)
where ε denotes the perturbation size for crafting an adversarial example x∗ from
an original input x. Given a clean image x, this method attempts to create a
similar image x∗ in the L∞ neighborhood of x that fools the target classifier. This
process maximizes the loss function L(x, y), which defines the cost of classifying
image x as the target label y. The FGSM solves this problem by performing
one-step gradient updates from x in the input space with a small perturbation
ε. Increasing ε increases the magnitude and speed of the attack-success rate,
but widens the difference between the adversarial sample and the original input.
FGSM computes the gradients only once, so is much more efficient than L-BFGS.
Despite its simplicity, FGSM is a fast and powerful generator of adversarial
examples. FGSM maximizes the loss function L(x, y) by gradient descent (GD),
a standard method for solving unconstrained optimization problems. Meanwhile,
constrained problems can be solved by projected gradient descent (PGD). Madry
el al. [12] applied PGD in a new adversarial attack method defined as:
x∗ = x+ δ · (5L (x, y)) respect to project(x,)(x∗) (3)
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Where project(x,)(x
∗) defines a projection operator with parameter x∗ on the
circle area around x with radius , δ is a clip value that is searched in a box
(x, ). In this paper, we employ both FGSM and PGD in the attack phase. The
adversarial attacks are created by a method called the attacking model. When
the attacking model is the target model itself or contains the target model, the
resulting attacks are white-box. In the present work, our method also operates
in a white-box manner.
Adversarial Defenses Adversarial training of machine learning systems has
been extensively researched [8,7]. This strategy trains the models on adversarial
examples to improve their attack robustness. Some researchers have combined
data augmentation with adversarial perturbed data for training [19,8,7]. How-
ever, this training is more time consuming than traditional training on clean
images alone, because it adds an extra training dataset to the training set,
which clearly extends the training time. In other defense strategies based on
pre-processing, the perturbation noise is removed before feeding the data into a
machine learning model. Meng el al. [13] proposed a two-phase defense model
that first detects the adversarial input, and then reforms the original input based
on the difference between the manifolds of the original and adversarial exam-
ples. Another adversarial defense direction is based on the gradient masking
method [7]. By virtue of the gradient masking, this defense strategy typically
ensures high smoothness in specific directions and neighborhoods of the train-
ing data, inhibiting attackers from finding the gradients of the good candidate
directions. Accordingly, they cannot perturb the input in a damaging way. Pa-
pernot et al. [15] adapted distillation to adversarial defense, and trained the
target model on soft labels output by another machine learning model. Nayebi
et al. [14] conferred robustness to adversarial examples by saturating the net-
work. The loss function in this strategy encourages the saturating regime of the
activations. Gu et al. [5] proposed the deep contrastive network, which imposes
a layer-wise contrastive penalty to achieve output invariance under input per-
turbations. However, methods based on gradient masking can be replaced by a
substitute model (a copy that imitates the defended model), which attackers can
train by observing the labels assigned by the defended model to inputs that are
chosen carefully by the adversary.
3 Proposed End-to-End System
3.1 Attack phase
Our targeted attack settings are white-box, meaning that attackers can fully
access the model type, model architecture, and all trainable parameters. The
adversary aims to change the classifier’s prediction to some specific target class.
Using the available information, the attackers identify the vulnerable portion of
the feature space, or seek the victim decision boundaries. The clean input of
the victim model is then altered by adversarial example methods. Adversarial
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samples that will be misclassified by machine learning models are generated
by an adversary with knowledge of the model’s classifier f and its trainable
parameters. In this work, adversarial examples are created by the FGSM [3] and
PGD methods [12]. We first define a classifier function f : Rn → [1...k] that
maps the image pixel-value vectors to a particular label. We then assume a loss
function L : Rn × [1...k] → R for function f . Given an input image x ∈ Rn
and target label y ∈ [1...k], our system attempts to optimize δ + L(x + δ, y)
subject to x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n , where δ is a perturbation noise added to the original
image x. Note that this function solves f(x) in the case of convex losses, but can
only approximately solve neural network problems, which involve non-convex
losses. In this case, the gradient is computed not from the Softmax output,
but from the output of the second-to-last layer logits. Our PGD-based attack
phase is described by Algorithm 1. In FGSM, Algorithm 1 is executed without
constraining ||δx||∞. In the attack phase, the learning rate for crafting adversarial
examples was set to 0.01 and the process was iterated 500 times. The targeted
output images were created from clean input images.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Crafting Adversarial Examples
input : x, ytrue, y
∗, f , , α
output : x∗
parameter : learning rate = 0.01, epochs = 500
1 x ← x∗ // initial adversarial sample
2 δx ← 0 // initial perturbation factor
3 while ||δx||∞ <  and f(x∗) 6= y∗ do
4 x∗ ← x+ α · sign(5L(y∗|x∗))
5 maximize L(y∗|x∗) with respect to ||δx||∞
6 x∗ ← clip(x∗, x− α, x+ α)
7 δx ← (x∗ − x)
8 end
9 return x∗
3.2 Detection phase
To create a new benchmark dataset for our detection system, we combined be-
nign images with the adversarial images created in the attack phase. Assuming
that the adversarial noises are high- frequency features on the images, we tar-
geted the high-frequency domains on the images while retaining all features in
the low-frequency areas. Various common algorithms are available for reducing
image noises before further processing such as classification. In this work, we in-
vestigate the two most well-known filters in image denoising studies: linear and
non-linear filters. For example, consider a new array with the same dimensions
as the specified image. Fill each location of this new array with the weighted
8 Dang Duy Thang and Toshihiro Matsui
sum of the pixel values from the locations surrounding the corresponding lo-
cation in the image, using a constant weight set. The result of this procedure
is shift-invariant meaning that the output value depends on the pattern (not
the positions) of the image neighborhood. It is also linear, meaning that sum-
ming the two images yields the same output as summing the separate outputs
of both images. This procedure, known as linear filtering, smooths the noises in
the images. One famous linear filter is the Gaussian filter, defined as
Gσ(i, j) =
1
2piσ2
e−
i2+j2
2σ2 . (4)
Here, i, j denotes the coordinate signal of the input and σ is the standard devia-
tion of the Gaussian distribution. Alternatively, noise removal can be considered
as filtering by a statistical estimator. In particular, the goal is to estimate the
actual image value of a pixel in a noisy measurement scenario. The class of noise-
removal filters is difficult to analyze, but is extremely useful. Smoothing an image
by a symmetric Gaussian kernel replaces a pixel value with some weighted av-
erage of its neighbors. If an image has been corrupted by stationary additive
zero-mean Gaussian noise, then this weighted average can reasonably estimate
the original value of the pixel. The expected noise response is zero. Weighting the
spatial frequencies provides a better estimate than simply averaging the pixel
values. However, when the image noise is not stationary additive Gaussian noise,
the situation becomes more complicated. In particular, consider that a region
of the image has a constant dark value with a single bright pixel composed of
noise. After smoothing with a Gaussian, a smooth, Gaussian-like bright bump
will be centered on the noise pixel. In this way, the weighted average can be
arbitrarily and severely affected by very large noise values. The bump can be
rendered arbitrarily bright by introducing an arbitrarily bright pixel, possibly
by transient error in reading a memory element. When this undesirable property
does not develop, the estimator outputs robust estimates. The most well-known
robust estimator computes the median of a set of values from its neighborhood.
A median filter assigns a neighborhood shape (which can significantly affect the
behavior of the filter). As in convolution, this neighborhood shape is passed over
the image, but the median filter replaces the current value of the element by
median of the neighborhood values. For the neighborhood surrounding (i,j), the
filter is described by:
xij = median(Xuv|Xuv ∈ Nij), (5)
where Xuv denotes the neighborhood points of xij . Any adversarial noises can
be attenuated by smoothing the pixels in the image. When adversarial noises are
absent, smoothing the pixels does not severely affect the input-image quality, so
the target classifier still recognizes the correct label. We name this process the
sieve process (indicated by the green arrow in Fig. 1).
Our proposed detection system runs the sieve and anchor processes in paral-
lel. The sieve process arrests the high frequencies in the input processing while
the anchor process transfers the input directly to the machine learning model.
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The probability of the highest-confidence class from the machine learning model
is assigned as the anchor. The sieve process then tracks the oscillations of classes
similar to the anchor class. If the probabilities p of the anchor and sieve differ
by more or less than the fixed threshold Θ, our system confidently determines
the input as adversarial or benign, respectively. Our system proceeds by Algo-
rithm 2, where κ denotes the kernel size, f is a machine learning function that
computes the probabilities of the predicted class, and s is the sieve function.
The sieve function based on the Gaussian filter is called the Detection System
based on Gaussian (DSG); the other sieve function is Detection System based
on Median (DSM).
Algorithm 2: Automated Detection System of Adversarial Examples with
a High-Frequency Sieve
input : X,Θ, s, f
output : 0, 1
// 0: benign; 1: adversarial
parameter : κ = [(3× 3); (5× 5)]
1 for ksize in κ do
2 for x in X do
3 anchorx ← x
4 sievex ← x
5 sievex ← s(sievex, ksize)
6 p(anchory) ← f(anchorx)
7 p(sievey) ← f(sievex|anchory)
8 end
9 end
10 if diff(p(anchory),min(p(sievey))) > Θ then
11 return 1
12 else
13 return 0
14 end
4 Implementation and Results
4.1 Datasets
The classification task was evaluated on two common benchmark datasets, namely,
MNIST and ImageNet.
Setup of MNIST The MNIST dataset [10] includes 70,000 gray images of
hand-written digits ranging from 0 to 9. It is separated into 60,000 training
images and 10,000 testing images. A single MNIST image is composed of 28×28
10 Dang Duy Thang and Toshihiro Matsui
pixels, each encoded by an 8-bit grayscale. We randomly extracted 200 images
of the digit “0” from the 10,000 testing images. From each of these 200 images,
we created nine adversarial images targeting the remaining digits (1-9). Finally
we created a new benchmark dataset of 2,000 images (200 benign images and
1,800 adversarial images).
Setup of ImageNet The ImageNet dataset [16] is a very large database de-
signed for visual object recognition research. The original ImageNet includes
more than 14 million images in 20,000 categories. Typical categories such as
“computer mouse” and “vending machine” comprise several hundred images. As
the machine learning model, we adopted Google Inception V3 [18] trained on
1,000 common categories in ImageNet. We randomly selected 1,000 testing im-
ages (excluding “ostrich” images). This selection of targeted class does not com-
promise the generality of our system. Applying the FGSM and PGD methods,
we crafted 2,000 adversarial “ostrich” images. Both image sets were combined
into a new benchmark repository of 3,000 images for our experiment.
4.2 Implementation
Although adversarial examples have recently attracted much interest from re-
searchers, a public benchmark dataset for evaluating the robustness of defense
systems remains lacking. In the attack phase of our system, we thus created a
new benchmark dataset for evaluating the detection capabilities of our detection
system.
The 200 random images of digit “0” extracted from the MNIST dataset
were converted to adversarial images of digits 1-9 by the FGSM method. The
FGSM was run through 1,000 iterations (epochs). The adversarial images were
combined with original images into the new benchmark dataset for evaluating
our detection system. The proposed detection system knows the true labels of
the input. When presented with the unknown input, our system automatically
processes the input and returns a decision (adversarial or benign).
Applying FGSM and PGD, we created adversarial “ostrich” images from
1,000 random ImageNet testing images. The original images were selected from
categories other than “ostrich”. The FGSM and PGD were each run through
500 iterations (epochs). Figure 2 shows five samples among the 1,000 randomly
picked images used for crafting the adversarial examples. The first row displays
the original (benign) images of a dish, hammerhead, mosque, oscilloscope and
parachute. Below the images, the probabilities present the highest probability of
each image class (indicated in parentheses).
In the sieve process, the kernel sizes of the Gaussian and median filters were
set to (3 × 3) and (5 × 5), respectively. Observing the probability changes of
the anchor before and after sieving, the input data were assessed as benign or
adversarial based on the given threshold.
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Fig. 2: Attack Phase Samples.
4.3 Results
Our results were compared with those of Xu et al. [21]. Our system is more
convenient that Xu’s system, owing to its high detection accuracy and easy setup.
Specifically, our system adopts a fixed threshold whereas Xu et al.’s system must
adapt the threshold value to individual cases. The performance of our system was
evaluated by the F1-score. When based on the Gaussian and median filtering,
our detection system is called DSG and DSM, respectively.
We observed and analyzed a typical oscilloscope image. From a benign oscil-
loscope image with a detection probability of 99.4%, we created two adversarial
images with the targeted label is ostrich, one by FGSM method, the other by
PGD method (Fig. 2). Afterward, the adversarial ostrich noises were sieved by
the DSG and DSM functions, and the oscilloscope features were regained. As
shown in Fig. 3, the probabilities of the targeted ostrich and legitimate oscil-
loscope dramatically differed when processed by the DSG and DSM functions.
When an input is Original Oscilloscope, classification probability is 99.4% for
oscilloscope label and the probabilities for true label are still remained round
99% after using DSG or DSM algorithms. Conversely, with an adversarial image
with targeted class ostrich, DSG and DSM not only remove adversarial noises
but only regain the probabilities of true label nearly equal to when using origi-
nal input. This observation confirms our assumption that adversarial noises are
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high-frequency noises, and that adversarial samples are powerfully detected by
adopting the low-pass filter in our model.
(a) Orginal Oscilloscope
Image
(b) Orginal Image with
DSG (3x3)
(c) Orginal Image with
DSM (3x3)
(d) Adversarial Image
(Ostrich)
(e) Adversarial Image
with DSG (3x3)
(f) Adversarial Image
with DSM (3x3)
Fig. 3: Original image (true class: Oscilloscope) and Adversarial image suffer to
DSG and DSM with kernel size is (3 × 3). (3a) for original input, classification
probability for oscilloscope label is 99.4%, (3b) for original input with DSG, clas-
sification probability for oscilloscope label is 99.7%, (3c) for original input with
DSM, classification probability for oscilloscope label is 99.6%, (3d) for adversar-
ial input, classification probability for ostrich label is 100%, (3e) for adversarial
input with DSG, classification probability for oscilloscope label is 99.7%, (3f) for
DSM input with classification probability for oscilloscope label is 98.9%
The detection results on the MNIST dataset are reported in Table 1. The
dashes in this table signify a lack of information from earlier research. Although
the same number of images was compared in ours and Xu et al.’s methods, we
created a more challenging test set than Xu et al. [21]. Whereas Xu et al. created
a balanced dataset of 1,000 legitimate images and 1,000 adversarial examples,
we created 1,800 adversarial images from 200 legitimate inputs, thus imposing
an imbalanced [17] dataset in our experimental test. Nevertheless, our detection
rates are highly competitive with those of Xu et al. and slightly surpass the
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earlier detection rates. Moreover, our system applies a fixed threshold for all
settings, whereas in Xu et al.’s work, the threshold must be adjusted in different
settings.
Table 1: Detection Rates on the MNIST dataset
Our Method Xu et al. [21]
DSG DSM Bit-Depth Smoothing Best-Joint
No. Files 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Threshold 0.1 0.1 0.0005 0.0029 0.0029
True Positive 1799 1796 - - -
True Negative 198 195 - - -
False Positive 2 5 - - -
False Negative 1 4 - - -
Accuracy 0.999 0.996 - - -
Precision 0.999 0.997 - - -
Recall 0.999 0.998 0.903 0.868 0.982
F1 score 0.999 0.998 - - -
On the ImageNet dataset, our detection rates exceeded those of Xu et al.
As highlighted in Table 2, we analyzed more files in this implementation than
Xu et al., while maintaining the imbalance in our benchmark dataset. Our de-
tection rate was 99.7% amd 100% with DSG and DSM, respectively, greatly
outperforming Xu et al.’s system.
Table 2: Detection Rates on the ImageNet dataset
Our Method Xu et al. [21]
DSG DSM Bit-Depth Smoothing Best-Joint
No. Files 3,000 3,000 1,800 1,800 1,800
Threshold 0.92 0.92 1.4417 1.1472 1.2128
True Positive 1994 2000 - - -
True Negative 995 875 - - -
False Positive 45 125 - - -
False Negative 6 0 - - -
Accuracy 0.983 0.958 - - -
Precision 0.978 0.941 - - -
Recall 0.997 1.000 0.751 0.816 0.859
F1 score 0.987 0.999 - - -
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5 Conclusion
We investigated the high-frequency noises in adversarial image examples. Based
on the high-frequency noise assumption and a theoretical framework, we demon-
strated the effectiveness of a low-pass filter in removing these noises. This obser-
vation guided the development of our automated detection system for adversarial
examples. On the MNIST and ImageNet datasets, our system achieved maxi-
mum accuracy rates of 99.9% and 100%, respectively. For evaluating our system,
we constructed new benchmark datasets posing more challenges than previously
constructed datasets [21,11]. Whereas the earlier studies evaluated their systems
on images from the training set, our evaluation employed the testing images.
Although we also challenged our model on imbalanced datasets, our detection
system delivered state-of-the-art performance. As another important contribu-
tion to the existing corpus, our system not only defeated adversarial noises, but
also regained the legitimate class from adversarial examples.
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